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This article discusses U.S.-China relations and the regional order in the Asia-
Pacific region under Xi Jinping’s regime with his slogan “China Dream” (the 
“Great Renewal of Chinese Nation”). This paper will be split into three sections. 
The first section investigates the fundamental principles of Xi Jinping’s foreign 
policy – the China Dream and the New Model of Major-Country Relations with 
the United States – and discusses how the New Model of Major-Country Relations 
with the United States is different from the so-called Group of Two (G2). The 
second section discusses America’s Rebalancing to Asia (or Pivot to Asia) Strategy 
and how it became the premise of Xi Jinping’s New Model of Major-Country 
Relations with the United States. It also discusses the mutual distrust and alarm 
the U.S. and China bear toward each other. Further, this section will argue that 
while both the Rebalancing Strategy of the Obama administration’s Asia-focused 
policy and the Xi Jinping administration’s U.S.-focused New Model of Major-
Country Relations policy are based on the strategy of realism, and while China’s 
hardline foreign policy is causing tension in Asia, the U.S.-China relationship is 
one of two nations pursuing collaborations in favor of confrontation and conflict. 
The third section examines how the deepening of the economic interdependence 
between the two nations has made it no longer possible to argue that the U.S.-China 
relation is a zero sum game. Lastly, this paper views how the new energy foreign 
policies of both the U.S. and China will further strengthen their relationship.
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Introduction
This article discusses U.S.-China relations and the regional order in the Asia-
Pacific region under Xi Jinping’s regime with his slogan “China Dream” (the 
“Great Renewal of Chinese Nation”). Xi Jinping became the General Secretary 
of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, and after assuming office 
of President of the People’s Republic of China in March 2013, he launched 
his foreign diplomacy in earnest.1 China’s fundamental foreign policy under 
Xi Jinping’s regime is comprised of five major points: 1) create foreign policy 
based on the Great Renewal of the Chinese Nation, a core principle of the China 
Dream; 2) construct a New Model of Major-Country36  Relations with the United 
States and promote relations with other major countries; 3) preserve friendship 
and cooperation with neighboring and developing countries; 4) strengthen mid- 
and long-term diplomacy strategy planning and preserve core interests; and 5) 
achieve unified, centralized leadership of diplomatic maneuvers of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC).2 Despite its amicable intentions, 
China’s foreign policy draws a hard line with its neighboring countries over 
conflicts regarding its core interests, such as territorial disputes over the Senkaku 
Islands and Spratly Islands.
For China, a country that views domestic economic development and 
social stability as its most important issues, the primary mission of its foreign 
diplomacy and national defense is to create a stable international environment in 
the surrounding region.3 The United States, separated from China by the Pacific 
Ocean, is neither China’s neighbor nor an Asian nation. Even so, China’s policy 
towards the U.S. is most important among its international strategies, and thusly 
embodies that importance.4 For China to determine the prospects of its relations 
with the U.S., it must inspect how America has changed its strategy and policy 
towards China. Furthermore, China must consider U.S. national security strategy 
and policy adjustments, since America’s plan towards China is influenced by its 
global and national security strategy.5 The United States is an actor with important 
influence on China wherever China deploys its foreign policy in the surrounding 
1 Emi Mifune, “Xi Takes ‘Chinese Dream’ to Foreign Diplomacy Arena,” The Asahi Shimbun: 
Asia & Japan Watch (April 23, 2013), at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/forum/politics_and_
economy/AJ201304230106> (searched date: 23 April 2013).
2 Yang Jiechi, “Innovation of Chinese Diplomatic Theory and Practice under the New 
Circumstances,” Qiushi, Issue 16 (August 2013): 8-10.
3 Wang Yizhou, Quanqiu zhenzhi he Zhongguo waijiao [Global Politics and China’s Foreign 
Policy] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2003), 285.
4 Yang Jiemian, Houlengzhanqi de zhongmei guanxi [China-U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold 
War Era],  (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000), 69. 
5 Liu Jianfei, “Zhanlue Jiyuqi he zhongmei guanxi” [Strategic Chance and China-U.S. 
Relations], Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], Third Period (2003): 56-57.
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region, be it East Asia,6 South Asia,7 Central Asia,8 or Southeast Asia. Therefore, 
this chapter considers China’s foreign policy towards the U.S. and the idea of 
order in the Asia-Pacific where America is the primary factor influencing China’s 
regional foreign policy and the formation of that regional order.
In the first year since Xi Jinping’s foreign policy was initiated, the basic 
framework of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship was to “cooperate” wherever 
the two nations could, and to “manage/control” wherever they could not, all 
the while remaining “cautious” of each other. Even though Xi Jinping’s foreign 
policy towards the U.S is hardline, he is not looking for conflict. Since the Obama 
administration’s foreign policy towards China has been fairly soft compared 
to its predecessors, the U.S.-China relation has remained relatively stable even 
though China has pursued a hardline policy towards its neighbors with regards to 
territorial disputes. While America stresses the importance of its alliances with 
other countries, it is also steadily building its “New Relationship” with China, 
which is causing concern among America’s friends and allies such as Japan, India, 
the Philippines and Vietnam, all of which refuse China’s hegemony in Asia.
To show how the U.S. and China, with mutual distrust and precaution, have 
begun exploring a framework for a new order in the Asia-Pacific region where 
power is in transition, this paper will be split into three sections.
The first section investigates the fundamental principles of Xi Jinping’s foreign 
policy – the China Dream and the New Model of Major-Country Relations with 
the United States – and discusses how the New Model of Major-Country Relations 
with the United States is different from the so-called Group of Two (G2).
The second section discusses America’s Rebalancing to Asia (or Pivot to Asia) 
Strategy and how it became the premise of Xi Jinping’s New Model of Major-
Country Relations with the United States. It also discusses the mutual distrust 
and alarm the U.S. and China bear toward each other. Further, this section will 
argue that while both the Rebalancing Strategy of the Obama administration’s 
Asia-focused policy and the Xi Jinping administration’s U.S.-focused New Model 
of Major-Country Relations policy are based on the strategy of realism, and 
6  Emi Mifune, “Japan’s Policy toward China,” in Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., 
The Troubled Triangle: Economic and Security Concerns for United States, Japan and China 
(New York: Macmillan, May 2013), 213-245; Emi Mifune, “Japan’s Perspectives toward 
Rising China,” in Herbert S. Yee, ed., China’s Rise - Threat or Opportunity? (NY: Routledge 
Security in Asia, 2013), 124-133.
7 Emi Mifune, “Japan-India-U.S. Relations and Rising China,” in Takenori Horimoto and 
Lalima Varma, eds., India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013), 93-
112.
8 Emi Mifune, “China’s Moves in Central Asia a Cause for Concern,” at <http://ajw.asahi.
com/article/forum/politics_and_economy/east_asia/AJ201310220045>; Emi Mifune, “China’s 
Policy toward Central Asia,” in Srikanth Kondapalli and Emi Mifune, eds., China and Its 
Neighbors (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), 220-242.
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while China’s hardline foreign policy is causing tension in Asia, the U.S.-China 
relationship is one of two nations pursuing collaboration in favor of confrontation 
and conflict.
The third section examines how the deepening of the economic interdependence 
between the two nations has made it no longer possible to argue that the U.S.-China 
relation is a zero sum game. Lastly, this paper views how the new energy foreign 
policies of both the U.S. and China will further strengthen their relationship.
1. The China Dream and New Model of Major-
  Country Relations with the U.S.
1)  China Dream
Ever since Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao to the post of General Secretary of 
the Chinese Communist Party, the China Dream has been voiced vigorously. The 
China Dream is “the Road toward the Great Renewal of Chinese Nation.”9 While 
not specifically defined, the anthem of Great Renewal of Chinese Nation exists as 
a political slogan of the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which calls 
for increasing China’s wealth and military strength.
The Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group of CCP makes decisions on 
important issues regarding foreign policy and national security. The head of 
this group is the president of PRC, second-in-command is the vice president 
of PRC, while third-in-command is the state councilor responsible for foreign 
policy. Within the administration, Xi Jinping, Li Yuanchao and Yang Jiechi are 
the three men in the top three posts that formulate China’s foreign policy. In 
a paper published in Quishi, a CCP journal on theoretical studies, Yang Jiechi 
stressed that they will devise a foreign policy based on the important ideology of 
China Dream.10 He argues in his paper that the vision of China Dream not only 
encourages determination and conviction in the Great Renewal of Chinese Nation 
among the Chinese people on a massive scale, but it simultaneously strengthens 
China’s influence and affinity with other countries, increases China’s position 
and voice in international relations at the working level, and fully embodies the 
organic connections and strong unification of domestic and foreign policies.11
With these aspirations in mind, China proposed a mechanism to realize the 
9 “Xi Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,’” Xinhua Net (November 29, 2012), at 
<news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm> (searched date: December 
1 2012).
10 Yang Jiechi, op.cit., 8-9.
11 Ibid, 9.
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China Dream of the Great Renewal of Chinese Nation: it was the New Model of 
Major-Country Relations with the United States.
2)  New Model of Major-Country Relations with the United States
While on a visit to the United States as vice president of the PRC, Xi Jinping 
proposed the original idea of the New Model of Major-Country Relations in talks 
with President Obama on February 15, 2012.12 While this idea is also used with 
Russia and the EU, its central focus is on the U.S.-China relationship.13 According 
to State Councilor Yang Jiechi, the top foreign policy official under Xi Jinping, 
the connotations of New Model of Major-Country Relations are: 1) no conflict or 
confrontation, 2) mutual respect, and 3) win-win.14
Part of the background giving rise to the New Model of Major-Country 
Relations is the debate on “Power Transition Theory” regarding China’s ascent 
to power. This theory, as propounded by international policy scholar A.F.K. 
Organski, states that during the process of an emerging nation’s rise to power, 
while that nation wants to expand its share, nations with dominant power begin 
to feel threatened and, since their primary interest is to suppress expansion of the 
emerging nation’s influence, there exists the inevitability of an outbreak of a war 
of hegemony. Organski asserts that since an emerging nation – that is, a nation 
gaining power – dissatisfied with the current balance of power, will be forced to 
challenge the current dominant power as part of the process of expanding their 
influence, the emerging nation is more aggressive than the dominant nation and is 
therefore more likely to cause a war.15 On the other hand, the “Power Differential 
Theory” as suggested by Dale C. Copeland and others argues that a weakening 
dominant nation is more likely to start war.16 According to Edward Hallett Carr’s 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, the most serious war is waged to strengthen a nation’s 
military power, and most wars are waged to prevent other countries from gaining 
more military power. In other words, a nation that is building a solid power 
position is more likely to start a war so that it can become even more powerful, 
while a weakening nation is motivated to start a war to prevent its enemy nations 
from gaining more power and to prevent deterioration of its relative power 
position.17
12 Qu Xing, “What Kind of ‘A New Model of Major Country Relationship China 
Needs?’” Xinhua Monthly, Issue 13 (July 2013): 3.
13 Qu Xing, ibid, 4.
14 Yang Jiechi, op.cit., 9.
15 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); A.F.K. Organski 
and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
16 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).
17 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 111.
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According to Qu Xing, a principal figure at the China Institute of International 
Studies, the three main points of the New Model of Major-Country Relations 
with the United States are: 1) seek a win-win relationship rather than viewing the 
relationship between major nations in power transition as a zero-sum game; 2) 
expand cooperation between the U.S. and China; and 3) control differences, or 
prevent the uncontrollable.18 Therefore, the strategic nature of the New Model of 
Major-Country Relations with the United States is utterly different from that of 
the New Model of Major-Country Relations with Russia and the EU. The New 
Model of Major-Country Relations with the United States is a strategy to prevent 
the U.S. and China from heading into a new cold war.
Ever since Xi Jinping said, “I stated that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough 
space for the two large countries of China and the United States”19 at a summit 
meeting with President Obama in June 2013 at Sunnylands Retreat in California, 
Chinese authorities at each level have continued to say that the New Model of 
Major-Country Relations is mutually understood by the U.S. and China; however, 
the U.S. does not share the same understanding as China regarding China’s core 
interests. When U.S. National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice said, “We (U.S. 
and China) seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations” in her 
talk entitled “America’s Future in Asia” in 2013,20 Asian nations, including Japan, 
became concerned. Because her speech was given three days before the day China 
set its “air defense identification zone,” her remarks carried even more symbolic 
weight, as if the U.S. approved of the New Model of Major-Country Relations. 
Reviews of the subsequent comments made by the Obama administration and 
media reports suggest that it is likely that Rice, not an expert on Asia, used the 
term New Model of Major-Country Relations without fully understanding its 
meaning.
What then does New Model of Major-Country Relations mean in regards 
to the formation of order in the Asia-Pacific region? According to Xi Jinping’s 
comments in a press conference with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden who visited 
China on December 4, 2013, it means to respect mutual “core interests” and 
major interests, and to handle sensitive issues and differences in an appropriate 
18 Qu Xing, op. cit., 4.
19 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and 
President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting” (June 7, 
2013), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/07/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-> (searched date: 8 June 2013).
20 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “National Security Advisor Rice on U.S.-Asia 
Relationship,” remarks as prepared for delivery at Georgetown University, Gaston Hall, in 
Washington, DC (November 20, 2013), at <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans
/2013/11/20131120287258.html?CP.rss=true#axzz2lEoZCXFq> (searched date: 12 November 
2013).
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manner. According to China’s Peaceful Development (Chinese White Paper) by 
the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
China is firm in upholding its “core interests”: 1) state sovereignty, 2) national 
security, 3) territorial integrity, 4) national reunification, 5) China’s political 
system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, 6) and the basic 
safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.21
In other words, China wants the U.S. to respect China’s position regarding 
their territorial disputes. China has stated its fundamental principle in this matter 
using twelve Chinese characters, “主権属我 ,  擱置争議 , 共同開発” (zhuquan 
shu wo, gezhi zhenyi, gongtong kaifa) – acknowledge China’s sovereignty, set 
aside disputes and pursue joint development. By stressing the New Model of 
Major-Country Relations, China’s true intent is to take a tough stance until its 
neighboring countries shelve the territorial disputes and begin joint development. 
China does not want America to interfere in its territorial issues with its neighbors.
The premise of U.S.-China foreign policy strategy is based on realism to 
maximize the balance of power to each country’s advantage. China does not 
aspire to become the strongest nation in the world. The goal of the China Dream 
is to become a dominant, major power in line with the United States. China wants 
to become the regional hegemon in Asia. It wants to shift the current balance of 
power in Asia to its advantage. In other words, the New Model of Major-Country 
Relations for which China is aiming under Xi Jinping’s regime, where the China 
Dream is the Great Renewal of the Chinese Nation, was proposed as a strategic 
tool for pursuing relative power that maximizes its share of the balance of power 
within the international system in Asia. This maximization of the balance of power 
is relative rather than absolute.
3)  China Seeks Bipolar System Unlike G2
Some mass media reports do not make any distinction between “G2” and the New 
Model of Major-Country Relations. Some of the Asian nations that reject China’s 
hegemony are concerned that Xi Jinping’s China has begun seeking a G2 system 
in which the world would be controlled by the U.S. and China.
In the midst of multi-polarized global politics, there has been global debate 
over the benefits and shortcoming of a U.S.-China joint control system, such 
as a G2 system or “Chimerika”; however, China has rejected the idea of a 
G2 system. It is an entirely different concept from the New Model of Major-
Country Relations with the United States. G2 is also unlike a U.S.-China bipolar 
system, which Chinese realists such as Yan Xuetong, Director of the Institute of 
21 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s 
Peaceful Development,” white paper (September 2011).
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International Studies in Tsinghua University, contend. Yan Xuetong argues that Xi 
Jinping’s foreign policy is completely different from Hu Jintao’s foreign policy. In 
his Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years,22 Yan Xuetong 
considers changes in international relations ten years from now and predicts that 
if China’s total national power exceeds 50% more than that of the U.S., the world 
will move from unipolar domination by the U.S. to bipolar domination by the 
U.S. and China. Predicting that Xi Jinping’s foreign policy will prioritize national 
security interests over economic interests, Yan Xuetong argues that U.S.-China 
bipolar domination is a mutual non-aggression mechanism that prevents conflict 
between the U.S. and China based on the New Model of Major-Country Relations 
with the United States, which pursues “cooperation without trust.” This differs 
from the G2 notion, which contends that the U.S. and China will lead the world.23
C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
put forth the idea of a G2 in 2004 where the two countries would form a system 
in which they would cooperate on equal footing, both taking leadership roles 
in global governance. Bergsten touched upon this concept again in his paper 
published in the summer of 2008.24 He argued that while it would be insensitive 
for the U.S. and Chinese governments to publicly use the term “G2” out of 
consideration of the positions of other major countries, the U.S. must make China 
its priority partner in managing today’s global economy. He further said that 
forming a G2 is the only way to fully obtain China’s cooperation and the U.S.’ 
involvement to create the true leadership so desperately needed by the world. 
Furthermore, Bergsten mentioned that after he expressed the idea of a G2 in 
late 2004, Robert Bruce Zoellick initiated dialogues with high-ranking Chinese 
officials, and Henry M. Paulson expanded those dialogues into what is now known 
as the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue with leaders from ten or more 
different ministries and agencies of both countries participating. These dialogues 
have put into place a framework primed for a G2, and a pattern of cooperation on 
issues such as the environment and international finance is taking shape. Bergsten 
also argued that it is not enough for China to be recognized merely as a “responsible 
stakeholder.” China must be recognized, and be accorded full rights, as a true 
leadership partner.
Niall Ferguson, an economist at Harvard University, introduced the concept of 
“Chimerika” in the March 4, 2007 edition of the Sunday Telegram. According to 
22 Yan Xuetong, Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years (Beijing: China 
Citic Press, July 2013).
23 Yan Xuetong stated in an interview, “If G2 means that two major countries lead the world, 
then both U.S. and China would not agree.” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 2013). 
24 C. Fred Bergsten, “How to Manage China’s Challenge to the Global Economy, Rush 
Transcript,” Federal News Service (June 19, 2008); C. Fred Bergsten, “A Partnership of 
Equals,” Foreign Affairs, 87-4 (Jul/Aug2008): 57-69.
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Ferguson, Chimerika is a symbolic interest community comprised of the U.S., the 
world’s largest consumer nation, and China, the world’s largest savings nation, 
which together will influence the global economy.
As the terms “G2” and “Chimerika” were being introduced in the media, 
the terms themselves took on a life of their own and their definitions became 
altogether different from their original meaning. Bergsten argued that a G2 would 
be effective only in the field of economics and that it would not necessarily be 
effective in other areas. He also said that in the international economic order led 
by the U.S where American interests such as exchange rates and trade are at stake, 
the U.S. would be an effective leader by involving China. The media, however, 
views a G2 as a U.S.-China bipolar system or U.S.-China joint control system.
There are many in China who criticize that a G2 is unrealistic, such as Huang 
Ping, Director General, Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS).25 There are some in China who say that U.S.-China joint 
control would be based on a bipolar world, and that since a G2 would relegate 
any other power to a sub-partner position, Russia would fear this as being anti-
Russian.26 Others have been critical of a G2, including Dennis Wilder, Senior 
Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council during the Bush 
administration, saying that it would damage U.S. relations with other Asian allies 
and friends, such as Japan and India. Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal on the 
Council on Foreign Relations also disapproved of a G2 as an unrealistic mirage.27
The idea of a G2 has raised concerns that the U.S. and China might divide the 
Pacific. Admiral Timothy J. Keating gave testimony at a hearing of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on March 11, 2008 that during his visit to China 
in May 2007, a top Chinese naval official half-jested that the Pacific should be 
divided and controlled by the U.S. and China by placing Hawaii as its base. 
That August, The Washington Times and others reported Keating’s testimony 
as a statement given by American military personnel. Admiral Keating rejected 
the Chinese official’s suggestion but it was reported in the U.S. that some U.S. 
government representatives, including its information agency, had taken a 
forward-looking attitude toward the proposal. There are some who voice concern 
regarding China’s ambition for a U.S.-China-divided Pacific.
As debates over a G2 have mounted, on May 19, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton pronounced that the U.S. would not give the Pacific to another 
25 Huang Ping, “Zhongguo yinzai G20 jiagouxia banyan geng zhongyao de guoji jiese” [China 
Plays a More Important International Role under the G20], at <http://www.china.com.cn/inter-
national/txt/2009-03/19/content_17466322.htm> (searched date: 20 March 2009).
26 Zhou Xinyu, “‘Zhongmeigongzhilun’ bianxinji” [Change of ‘U.S.-China Condominium 
Theory’], Guoji xianqu daobao [International Herald Leader] (May 26, 2009).
27 Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, “The G2 Mirage: Why the United States and China 
Are Not Ready to Upgrade Ties,” Foreign Affairs, 88-3 (May/Jun 2009): 14-23.
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nation. The next day, Wen Jiabao stated in a press conference at the China-EU 
summit in the Czech Republic, “Some say that world affairs will be managed 
solely by China and the U.S.  I think that view is baseless and wrong.” Wen 
continued, “China is committed to an independent foreign policy of peace and 
pursues a mutually-beneficial strategy of opening up.” He added, “China stands 
ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries and it will 
never seek hegemony.” He also said, “It is impossible for a couple of countries 
or a group of big powers to resolve all global issues. Multi-polarization and 
multilateralism represent the larger trend and the will of the people.”28 Wen Jiabao 
again ruled out the idea of a G2 notion in his talks with President Obama during 
his visit to China on November 18, 2009.
China is taking a negative position regarding a G2 because it presumably does 
not want to bear excessive responsibility on important issues such as climate 
control, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, marine issues and cyber 
security. By denying a G2 and proposing a New Major Country Relationship, 
China is asking the U.S. to respect China as an equal nation rather than as a 
partner supporting the international agenda led by the U.S., and to accept China’s 
personally-defined national interests.
2. China Watchful of America’s Rebalancing to Asia 
  Strategy
1) Evaluating the China Threat and America’s Rebalancing to Asia Policy 
President Obama stated in a speech in November 2009 in Tokyo:
The national security and economic growth of one country need not come at the 
expense of another. I know there are many who question how the United States 
perceives China’s emergence. But as I have said, in an interconnected world, 
power does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the 
success of another. Cultivating spheres of cooperation – not competing spheres 
of influence – will lead to progress in the Asia-Pacific.29 
28 Global Times (May 22, 2009).
29 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama at 
Suntory Hall,” at Suntory Hall in Tokyo, Japan (November 14, 2009), at <http://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall> (Searched date: 15 
November, 2009).
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He also affirmed, “…the United States does not seek to contain China, nor does 
a deeper relationship with China mean a weakening of our bilateral alliances.30 
Obama welcomed China’s rising power, saying, “…the rise of a strong, prosperous 
China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.”31 Later, Obama 
and Hu Jintao announced in a joint statement in Beijing, “The two countries 
believe that to nurture and deepen bilateral strategic trust is essential to U.S.-China 
relations in the new era.”32
While the U.S. was focused on its war on terrorism, China emerged and the 
importance of Asia in the global economy soared. U.S. influence in the Asia-
Pacific, on the other hand, relatively declined. The Obama administration 
named the U.S. a “Pacific country,” subsequently deepening and expanding its 
involvement, and intensifying its presence in the area.33 The Obama administration 
views the maintenance of its position as a Pacific country as a long-term national 
interest, stating five keys to its Asia-Pacific policy:
(1) the U.S.’ alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, remain the foundation for our strategic engagement 
in the region, and the Obama administration is committed to strengthening and 
modernizing our alliances to address both continuing and emerging challenges;
(2) the Obama administration is committed to broadening our relations with 
growing powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Vietnam and most notably India:
(3) an important component of our efforts in the Asia-Pacific is an approach to 
China that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles 
and interests;
(4) the Obama administration is committed to enhancing engagement in Asia-
Pacific multilateral organizations;
(5) the Obama administration is pursuing an aggressive economic and trade 
agenda in Asia.34
On January 5, 2012, the Obama administration announced its guideline that 
will become America’s national defense strategy for the next 10 years, Sustaining 
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Statement” (November 
17, 2009), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement>
33 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (October 11, 2011).
34 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and 
Asia in U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 112-15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, March 31, 2011), at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65495/
html/CHRG-112hhrg65495.htm>
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U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.35 This new strategy 
positions China and Iran as enemy nations, and stresses the implementation of the 
Joint Operational Access Concept as a deterrent against attack within the Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2AD) environment, all the while reducing national defense 
expenditures and increasing American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. With 
an eye toward China’s A2AD, this guideline focuses on Air-Sea-Battle (ASB), 
cyberspace and aerospace strategies, rather than using conventional large-scale 
armies and navies.
Three weeks after the Obama administration’s announcement, Defense 
Secretary Leon E. Panetta announced an outline of the national defense budget 
based on the new defense strategy.36 Although the Obama administration is 
prioritizing recovery of the domestic economy with the intention of trimming its 
$487B budget over the next ten years and $259B budget over the next five years, 
it will continue to put importance on the Asia-Pacific region.
The concept behind these American strategies is “tailored deterrence,” as 
described in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (QDR2010.)37 This tailored 
deterrence concept has come into favor since the shift from nuclear deterrence 
was planned in QDR2006. This type of deterrence is intended to form a “deterrence 
net against potential enemies” by strengthening the architecture that maintains 
U.S. hegemony in the region through bolstering relations with American allies 
and friends as each builds up its own national power, including defense (security) 
capabilities, and sharing the burden of deterrence with them. In other words, 
proceeding with its offensive strategy, America will beef up its regional deterrence 
architecture38 in an effort to halt China as it simultaneously creates a Chinese 
deterrence net to strengthen that very architecture.
Reports relating to security from the Obama administration over the last 
three years show that the national security issues of instability within the global 
commons and increased challenges for America as it deals with a vulnerable 
nation have classified China as a concern. An example of instability within the 
global commons is China’s increased investment in A2AD to blunt the U.S. 
military’s power projection in cyberspace and aerospace. According to Director 
of National Intelligence James R. Clapper’s Worldwide Threat Assessment report 
35 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012).
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, January 2012).
37 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, February 2010).
38 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report stated notion of “regional missile deterrence archi-
tecture.” This was published at the same time as QDR which suggested “regional deterrence 
architecture.”
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delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at the start of 2012, 
China and Russia are seen as the greatest cyber threats.39 Examples of increased 
challenges with vulnerable nations are the conflicts in the South China Sea and 
the Senkaku Island issues. At a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee 
in March 2012, U.S. Navy Admiral Robert F. Willard gave testimony that the 
Chinese military has continued to challenge the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-
Pacific maritime, cyber and space domains.40
Watching China make such moves, the U.S. is forming mid- and long-term 
strategies against China. The major goals of America’s China policy are to prevent 
and deter, and prepare, which China views as aggressive. It should be noted that at 
a press conference announcing QDR2010, the then-defense secretary Robert Gates 
had already stated that the concept of ASB, long-range attack capability, and space 
and cyber domains were of concern.41
2)  China and U.S.-China Relations in a Changing World
Ever since President Obama, on a visit to Japan in November 2009, declared the 
“rebalancing to Asia” (pivot to Asia) strategy, China has been concerned with the 
influence of that strategy. China is a strategic nation, one that is based on realism, 
just like the U.S., and it tries to balance its power with other nations based on 
those nations’ strategies against China.
Ma Xiao Jun and Gao Zugui, professors at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee, stated in Dangdai Zushi [Contemporary World], the journal 
of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee, that the U.S. rebalancing strategy has further complicated 
the international environment between China and its neighbors, and has put 
pressure on the maintenance of stability and protection of interests in the region.42 
Traditionally, China has ignored international laws in territorial disputes, forced 
change by pushing the comparative advantage of its military strength, and has 
endeavored to maintain stability and protect its interests. Now, however, because 
of the American rebalancing strategy, China must strive for restrictive cooperation.
Cheng Xiangyang, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Political Studies of 
39 James R. Clapper,“Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 31, 2012).
40 House Armed Services Committee, Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. 
Pacific Command Posture (Washington, DC, March 1, 2012).
41 “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon.”
42 Ma Xia jun and Gao Zugui, “Shijie bianju zhong de zhongguo guoji zhanlue” [Chinese 
International Strategy under the World Fluid Situation], Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World] 
First Period (2012): 13-15.
The Sway of Strategic Cooperation and Deterrence on U.S.-China Relations
48 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.3, No. 2
the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, shared his prospect 
for international affairs in 2012 by writing in Xinhua’s Liaowang Xinwen 
Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly] that one factor that could shock the harmonized and 
stable order in the Asia-Pacific is America’s plan to maintain its hegemony in the 
region under the slogan of “America’s Pacific Century.”43 In other words, China 
believes that as order is being formed in the region, the U.S. is simultaneously 
reviving its presence and attempting to weaken China’s influence.
Chinese Army Major General Peng Guangqian, a renowned military expert 
in China, argues that the U.S. rebalancing policy focuses on building a strategic 
deterrence system against China. He contends that America’s strategy in Asia to 
contain China as a potential enemy consists of six systems: 1) an ASB campaign 
system, where China is presumed to be the main target, the Western Pacific is the 
main combat area, and the forces used to stop China’s A2AD are mainly air and 
naval; 2) a military alliance system, which sets two major strategic points, Japan 
in the north and Australia in south, as it deepens both the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-
Korea alliances to integrate them as a trilateral alliance, and later incorporating 
India, Vietnam and the Philippines to create a smaller, Asian version of NATO; 
3) a military base system built along a line of islands in the Western Pacific; 4) 
a political infiltration system with Western values as its core; 5) an economic 
deterrence system based on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) that excludes China and establishes U.S. hegemony; and 6) a 
“forward-deployed diplomacy” aimed at disrupting and provoking the break-up of 
friendly relations between China and its neighbors.44
Peng Guangqian has offered the following two points about the goal of 
America’s strategic shift of focus in East Asia. The first point is that it aims to 
maintain prodigious power able to take military action against China at any time, 
continuing America’s militaristic and overbearing attitude toward China while also 
excluding it, as it is America’s largest strategic rival and a threat to its hegemony. 
The second point is that it aims to create the atmosphere of a “China threat,” to 
strengthen control over the vast no-man’s-land in the Asia-Pacific between China 
and the U.S. and prevent the decline of American authority. Furthermore, it hopes 
to expand U.S. power in South and Southeast Asia, solidify American leadership 
in the Asia-Pacific, and preserve its long-term hegemony in the region.45
According to the 2012 Blue Book of Asia Pacific46 by the Chinese Academy of 
43 Cheng Xiangyang, “Yuanzhan 2012 Guoji xinzhi zouxiang” [Prospects on International 
Affairs in 2012], Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan, Second Period (January 2012): 61.
44 Peng Guangqian, “Zhongmei guanxi fashen zhibian junshi chongtu bingfei bukeneng” 
[Qualitative Changes of China-U.S. Relations May Cause Military Collision], at <http://www.
xinhuapo.com/html/2011/zjgd_1227/3315.html> (searched date: 20 January 2012).
45 Peng Guangqian, op. cit.
46 Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Blue Book of 
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Social Science, the U.S. rebalancing strategy has the twin goals of maintaining 
its cooperation with China and containing China. The publication also says that 
the reasons why the U.S. chose a rebalancing strategy when faced with a rising 
China was to prevent a China-led political and economic order in future Asia, to 
establish America’s position of leadership in the formation of order in Asia, and to 
incorporate China within this order.47 It also pointed out that, under the American 
rebalancing strategy, the world’s major powers are all rebuilding their strategies 
for Asia where China inhabits the core. Furthermore, it continues to explain that 
China’s peripheral environment has become ever more complicated by the U.S. 
rebalancing strategy that has brought new challenges to China, so China must 
come up with new strategic ideas to respond to these changes and trials.48
With the above in mind, it is worth noting the public announcements of defense 
expenditures for 2012. While major powers cut their defense expenditures due to 
the stagnant global economy, in 2012 China’s expenditures exceeded the $100B 
mark for the first time.49 This figure is roughly 1.85 times Japan’s defense costs, 
ranking second in the world, right behind the U.S. for the third year in a row. 
Some say China’s actual defense expenditures were two to three times as much. 
In other words, it can be deduced that China’s message to the world was that it 
exceeded the $100B mark for the first time. Given that the real and published 
amounts were incongruous, they could have easily reported only the smaller 
amount, but the fact that they chose to disclose their large spending suggests their 
intention of being aggressive in the future. The Washington Post estimates that 
China’s defense expenditures in 2015 will exceed the total defense costs of its 
neighboring twelve countries and expressed concern for security in Asia-Pacific.50 
Such arguments about China being a threat will most likely become more 
prevalent going forward.
3. Deepened U.S.-China Interdependency and 
Change in Regional Order
1)  Mutual Restraint in the U.S.-China Economic Relationship 
According to an announcement by the U.S. Treasury, the amount of U.S. Treasury 




49 “2012nian zhongguo guofangyusuan 6702.74 yiyuan bi shangnian zeng 11.2%” [China 
Raises Defense Budget 11.2% to 670 Billion Yuan in 2012], Xinhua Net, at <http://news.xin-
huanet.com/politics/2012lh/2012-03/04/c_131444992.htm> (searched date: 5 March 2012).
50 Keith B. Richburg, “China’s Military Spending to Top $100 billion in 2012,” The 
Washington Post (March 4, 2012).
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bonds owned by foreign countries totaled U.S.$5716.9B as of November 2013.51 
China was the largest creditor nation with holdings of U.S.$1316.7B, and it has 
been the top holder of U.S. Treasury bonds since September 2008. After China 
joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, its foreign currency reserve has 
expanded, and at the same time, it has significantly expanded its share of U.S. 
Treasury bonds among foreign holders. China’s 5.9% share (excluding Hong 
Kong) among foreign holders at the end of 2000 grew to 23% by November 
2013.52 The trend of overseas investors, mainly by Japan and China, has had 
an important influence on the increase in bond issues that are part of the U.S. 
economic stimulus. The U.S. economy cannot recover as long as the position of 
country with the most U.S. Treasury bonds is held by a perceived enemy.
On the other hand, there are some in China who argue that China should reduce 
its U.S. Treasury bond holdings. However, China manages most of the world’s 
largest foreign currency reserve in U.S. dollars. A sharp fall in the dollar would 
lead to a drop in asset value. If the rate for the RMB against the dollar increases, 
there will be less incentive for China to buy U.S. Treasury bonds. In other 
words, because of its financial struggles, the U.S. government wants China to 
continue buying U.S. Treasury bonds, and thus cannot be too assertive in asking 
the Chinese government to revalue the RMB. Furthermore, as long as China 
continues to be the largest holder of U.S. Treasury bonds, they will be able to seek 
concessions from the United States. If China ever decides to leave its position as 
largest holder, Japan will move into that position.53
Reviewing the transitions in U.S.-China trade, in 1980 U.S. imports from China 
were U.S.$983M (Chinese data) and U.S. $1.164B (U.S. data); however, in 2012 
these numbers grew to U.S.$351.796B (Chinese data) and U.S.$425.579B (U.S. 
data). In 1980, exports from China to the U.S. were U.S.$3.83B (Chinese data) 
and U.S.$3.755B (U.S. data). In 2012, exports expanded to $132.886B (Chinese 
data) and U.S.$110.484B (U.S. data). As of November 2013, the U.S. year-to-
date total trade with China was 14.5% of the total trade amount, second only to 
Mexico.54
The U.S.-China economic relationship is not a simple one where China 
51 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities” 
(Washington, DC: May 15, 2014), at <http://www.treasury.gov/ticdata/Publish/mfh.txt> 
(searched date: 17 January 2014).
52 Ibid.
53 As of November 2013, Japan holds $1186.4B of the U.S. bonds, sharing 20.8% of the total 
overseas share. They are followed by China, which holds $1316.7B. This is far more than 
the $290.9B (5.1% of the total amount) held by the Caribbean Banking Centers (Bahama, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands) which rank third.
54 U.S. Census Bureau, “Top Trading Partners - November 2013,” at <http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/Press-Release/2013pr/11/> (searched date: 17 January 2014).
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exports to the U.S. and then uses the profits to purchase U.S. Treasury bonds. 
The Chinese economy has already become intertwined with that of the U.S., 
and economic development in China cannot escape the influence of the U.S. 
economic situation. The American economy needs China’s support to recover. 
Huge foreign demand and government-led public investments are what is 
driving China’s economic growth. In other words, its economic growth is being 
pulled along by China’s expanding trade surplus with the United States. This 
has created a middle class in China and their affluence has become the key 
to expanding domestic demand. Furthermore, the expanding trade surplus is 
increasing profits, and it is this money that China is lending to the U.S..
As an investment target for China’s huge foreign currency reserve, the rate 
of return for the euro and yen is too low. The scale and liquidity of assets of 
other countries do not allow for sufficient management. If China spreads its 
investment risk among other countries, the U.S. dollar will drop dramatically, 
thus also causing a huge decline in Chinese assets. If countries including China 
do not buy U.S. Treasury bonds, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) itself will 
buy them, which may lead to inflation and a steep drop in the value of the dollar. 
Therefore, after the shock caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, 
the U.S. government issued a large amount of government bonds to stimulate the 
economy; China was the major buyer of these bonds. China must support the U.S. 
in this economic crisis lest its own economy suffer.
The economy and finance of the U.S. and China are mutually intertwined 
and in the near term neither can escape from the other’s bonds. In a joint 
announcement in November 2009, the U.S. and China reconfirmed that they will 
not target each other with their strategic nuclear weapons, a promise made back 
on June 27, 1998. The deepening economic and financial relationship between 
the two countries has built a mutually-bound relationship structure without the 
need for Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) using strategic nuclear weapons.
2)  China as an Important Economic Partner
This expansion of the economic relationship is changing the awareness of China 
in the United States. Figures One and Two show the results of an opinion poll 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in December 2013. The 
survey was conducted by telephone on 1,000 general respondents 18 years of age 
and older and on 201 respondents in various leadership positions (bureaucrats, 
politicians, business people and members of academia, the media, religious groups 
and labor relations). The level of confidence was 95% and the sampling error was 
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±3% in the former group and ±7% in the latter group.55
Figure 1: Which country in Asia do you think is the most important partner of the 
United States? 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “2013 Opinion Poll on How Americans 
Perceive Japan,” at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000022800.pdf> (see 
attached Excel file).
Figure 1 shows a shift in the American response rate for China and Japan 
when respondents were asked which Asia-Pacific country they considered the 
most important of the United States from the following list (Japan, China, 
Australia, South Korea, India, Russia, Other, None),.56 The 2013 survey showed 
35% of the general respondents answered Japan, while 39% answered China, 
giving China the top spot for four years consecutively. When the same question 
was asked of opinion leaders, 39% answered Japan, while 43% answered China.
Figure 2 shows the responses given when respondents were asked why they 
chose China as the most important partner to the United States. The response 
rate for “Trade/Economy relations with U.S.” showed a steep increase compared 
to previous years, with 80% of the general group choosing this response (as 
compared to 41% in 2012 and 43% in 2011) and 78% of the opinion leader 
group (as compared to 37% in 2012 and 43% in 2011). Americans see China 
as an important trade and economic partner. The response rate for “Political 
Relations with China” was 11% for the general group and 26% for the opinion 
leader group. Among those who responded that Japan is the most important 
partner for the America region, 48% came from the general group and 61% were 
of the opinion leader group. Compared to these figures, the percentage of people 
who said political relations with China were an important factor was low.
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The 2013 Opinion Poll on How Americans Perceive 
Japan (Summary of the Result)” (in Japanese) (December 19, 2013), at <http://www.mofa.
go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_000456.html>
56 Korea was one of the options only during 2011 to 2013. In the opinion leaders’ responses, it 
was 8% in 2011, 1% in 2012, and 14% in 2013, respectively. In the general responses, it was 
7% in 2011, 1% in 2012, and 7% in 2013, respectively.
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Figure 2: Reasons Why China is the Most Important Partner of the United States 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (See Figure 1; see attached Excel file).
3)  America Reluctant to Be Involved
The same survey asked if the U.S. should maintain its current Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.57 Of 
the general group, 67% said yes, while 77% of the opinion leader group said yes. 
Figure Three shows a sharp downward shift in Yes response rates. From this, it 
can be supposed that Americans are willing to cooperate in strengthening the 
alliance with Japan but are reluctant to become involved in any conflict between 
Japan and China over the recent Senkaku Islands issue.
Figure 3: Should or Should not the U.S. continue to operate under the current 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America?
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (See Figure 1; see attached Excel file). 
Americans generally to see the Senkaku Islands issue as a conflict between 
Japan and China over a group of small rocky islets in the East China Sea. They 
tend to overlook the two most important points behind China’s argument: 1) 
57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, op. cit.
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potential of expansion into all of Okinawa Prefecture; and 2) the maritime 
strategic goal of controlling the gateway to the Pacific. Considering China’s 
long-term maritime strategic goal of expanding its maritime hegemony to 
the whole Western Pacific, the Senkaku Islands issue, similar to the Taiwan 
integration issue, becomes a strategic point for China, desperate to secure a 
gateway to the Pacific so as to grasp maritime hegemony in the Western Pacific.
4)  Shale Gas Revolution and Expansion of U.S.-China Relations
China’s energy policy is one of the factors strengthening the U.S.-China 
relationship. The shale gas revolution in the U.S. will deepen China’s 
dependency on the U.S.. As China becomes more dependent on oil and natural 
gas imports, it shares the same goal as America of supplying safe, cheap and 
clean energy. It must share investment, regulation and technology, and expand 
exchange among industries. This means that U.S.-China cooperation will expand 
not only to trade in energy resources, but also to climate change issues and 
economic and financial areas. Furthermore, regarding all of this, China’s rights 
and interests are closely related to the power struggle within the CCP.
According to World Energy Outlook 2013 published by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), non-conventional shale gas development will bring an 
about-face to the global energy picture, and that the U.S. will surpass Saudi Arabia 
to become the largest oil-producing country by 2017. The IEA also predicts that 
within the next three years the U.S. will become the largest gas-producing country, 
surpassing Russia.58 The shale gas revolution is putting an end to the theories of 
America’s demise as the U.S. moves to take over leadership of the world’s energy 
economy.
China’s energy policy must take China-U.S. interdependency to a deeper 
level. China says it will extract 6.5 billion cubic meters of shale gas in 2015. 
Estimates put China’s shale gas reserve at 31.6 trillion cubic meters, roughly 
1.7 times the size of America’s reserve, but China will need a higher level of 
technology to develop it on its own. China’s production target of 6.5 billion cubic 
meters represents a very small percentage of China’s consumption of natural gas; 
however, unlike in the U.S., the shale stratum in China is several thousand meters 
deep, which will make it difficult for them to reach their target given their current 
technology. To develop that shale gas, China absolutely must cooperate with the 
United States.
58 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2013 (London: IEA, November 12, 
2013).
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Figure 4: Cumulative Chinese FDI in the United States, by Sector, 2000-2013 Q2 (total 
deal value $27.9 billion)
Source: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Report to 
Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” (November 
20, 2013), at <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2013%20
Report%20to%20Congress.pdf>
Under Xi Jinping’s America policy, bolstering the relationship in the energy 
realm continues to be an important issue between the U.S. and China. When 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang met with Vice President Joe Biden on December 
5, 2013, they agreed to strengthen their cooperation regarding climate change 
and energy. They also confirmed their desire to begin real negotiations toward 
concluding U.S.-China investment agreements to secure an open and fair investing 
environment. The Chinese need technological help from America to develop their 
shale gas venture, and they are also considering importing shale gas from the 
U.S.  According to the 2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission submitted to Congress in November by the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressional advisory 
committee, 44% of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. during the 
period from 2000 to the first half of 2013 was in the area of energy (see Figure 4).59 
This can be read that China is investing heavily in the U.S. to acquire high-level 
shale gas extraction technology.
59 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S.CC 2013 Annual Report 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 20, 2013), at <http://origin.
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%202013%20Annual%20Report.
PDF>
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China’s decision to liberalize energy prices is also ultimately playing a large 
role in its shift toward clean energy and may provide an opportunity to extend the 
areas of cooperation between the U.S. and China to the issue of climate change. In 
the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in November 
2013, the CCP implemented price reforms in the areas of oil and natural gas, as 
well as a policy for introducing market principles.60 Going forward, China will 
incorporate the development of shale gas as a national strategic emerging industry, 
and will intensify its fiscal support of shale gas exploration and development. The 
decision to liberalize energy prices will force Chinese companies to realize they 
will no longer be able to wantonly and inefficiently consume cheap energy. It will 
also quickly promote the need for improving their energy consumption efficiency.
Furthermore, realignment of vested-interest groups in the natural resources 
sector in 2013 brought immense profits from investments in America to Xi 
Jinping’s ruling circle. This will make China’s cooperative diplomacy with the 
U.S. regarding energy resource policy all the more important. For Xi Jinping, 
one of the keys to realigning the power base within the CCP is change in the 
vested-interest structure derived from the development of shale gas in China. The 
leadership wants to lead shale gas development themselves, and wants to reel in 
vested-interests in oil and natural gas. In 2013, Zhou Yongkang (ranking ninth 
in the 17th Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of CCPCC during the 
Hu Jintao period) and other oil clique magnates were being ousted one after the 
other. Three factors figured into Zhou Yongkang’s fall: 1) removal of Jiang Zemin 
and his group’s influence; 2) Xi Jinping’s public security sector power grab; and 
3) political jockeying to exclude the oil clique. Zhou Yongkang, who supported 
Bo Xilai, the former leader of Chongqing City,61 was the oil clique and public 
security boss. In September 2013, just prior to Zhou Yongkang’s ouster toward the 
end of that year, Jiang Jiemin, Yongkang’s close aide and former ministerial-level 
director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASACSC), and more than 200 others, including those in 
charge of CNPC asset management, were arrested or questioned. The SASACSC 
controls China’s major state-owned companies and as such is in a position to 
protect the vested interests of the oil clique. Jiang Jiemin was a magnate and 
former president of China’s largest state-owned oil company, China National 
60 “Shouquan fabu: zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda 
wenti de jueding” [Authorized Release: Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s 
Decision on Important Issues about Entirely Deepening Reform], Xinhua Net (November 15, 
2013), at <news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm> (searched date: 16 
November 2013).
61 When reporting on ousted Zhou Yongkang on December 9, 2013, The Oriental Daily News 
reported that Zhou Yongkang was attempting to oust Xi Jinping by using Anti-Japanese 
sentiment.
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Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). He was ousted on “suspicion of serious violations 
of discipline.”
For the Xi Jinping leadership, the revolution in shale gas is an essential factor 
in realigning the power base within the CCP. They want to take the lead in gaining 
vested interest in the natural resources sector.
Conclusion
Three points can be drawn from the observations discussed in this chapter on 
how China, an emerging power in the Asia-Pacific, and the United States, with its 
reconsidered role in the region, are trying to form a relationship. 
First, while the U.S. and China have begun seeking their way toward framing 
a New Major-Country Relationship, the two nations are unable to share their 
understanding of what a New Major-Country Relationship means. While one 
basic principle for both sides of their relationship is “cooperation,” another is 
“deterrence.” America is trying to deter China, which is pushing its hardline 
foreign policy on its neighbors. China is attempting to deter U.S. intervention. 
The two nations are swaying between “cooperation” and “deterrence” as they are 
trying to build a New Relationship to manage their points of contention. The U.S. 
wants the New Major-Country Relationship to be a mechanism for deterring and 
managing China’s hardline foreign policy, and for forcing China to participate 
in regional and global issues. China, on the other hand, wants the New Major-
Country Relationship to be a mechanism for deterring the U.S. from intervening in 
its core interests and domestic affairs. As a result, America and China are unable 
to share a common understanding of the New Model of Major-Country Relations.
Second, a basic premise of the current foreign policy strategies of the U.S. and 
China is based on the realism of maximizing national interests and maximizing 
the balance of power to each nation’s best advantage. Such a mutual strategy 
is creating instability in the Asia-Pacific regional order. China is not aiming 
to become the world’s strongest superpower. Its China Dream is to become 
a dominant major power that can stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. 
within the international system. China wants to become a regional hegemon; it 
wants to change the current distribution of power in Asia, and change it so the 
balance is in China’s favor. In other words, the New Model of Major-Country 
Relations that China wants as part of the China Dream that is the Great Renewal 
of Chinese Nation being put forth by Xi Jinping is to pursue the expansion of 
its relative power that would maximize its share of the balance of power within 
the international system of Asia. This maximization of the balance of power is 
maximization of “relative” power rather than “absolute” power. What this goal of 
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China maximizing its “relative” power means is the relative decrease of American 
influence in Asia. But America is not a country that will sit idly by and let this 
happen.
Since both countries base their foreign policy strategy on realism, one cannot 
argue U.S.-China relations under Xi Jinping’s regime from the viewpoint of 
liberalism or social constructivism. Liberalists point to international institutions or 
interdependence as mechanisms for bringing nations toward cooperation; however, 
these have never constrained U.S. or Chinese actions because they act based on 
realism. Rather, both countries use international institutions and interdependence 
to maximize their own national interests. There are no international systems or 
regimes that can keep their actions in check in Asia or in the world. For both the 
U.S. and China, international institutions and interdependence are simply means 
of expressing how high each country’s own international status is and to show off 
to the world the balance of power between them.
There is also a limit to arguing the U.S.-China relationship from the viewpoint 
of social constructivism. The holism of social constructivism analyzes the 
international structure as one unit, thus international factors are always given 
priority over domestic ones, but this underestimates one extremely important 
factor: domestic politics that determine foreign policy can affect international 
relationships. Furthermore, by overvaluing the norm, it is easy to overlook 
aspects determined by the distribution of power among countries. Additionally, 
the degree of influence that non-material factors such as norms and identities can 
have on foreign policy is quite different by country. For example, while Europe 
and Japan tend to be largely influenced by international norms, the U.S. and China 
are generally not. The social constructivist would argue that international norms 
take precedence over domestic ones. Although this can be proven in European 
countries and Japan, in the U.S. and China, national interests are given priority 
over international norms.
Third, “cooperation” and “deterrence” are fundamental to the U.S.-China 
relationship, but “containment” is not. There is no country that can contain China, 
considering its economic strength, military power, geography, population and land 
area. Even if an anti-China alliance were to be created, it would be very unlikely 
that it would be able to contain a China that is attempting to change the current 
state of things. Furthermore, since the U.S. and China have deepened their mutual 
economic dependency, any conflict between them will damage the economies 
of both countries. The intertwining of their economies and finance is deepening 
the economic dependency that is mutually binding their interests. This is causing 
Americans to become increasingly aware that China is their important partner in 
Asia and thus it is possible that America’s role as the offshore-balancer in Asia 
may gradually diminish.
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Therefore, as discussed in the three points above, the U.S.-China relationship 
under Xi Jinping’s administration is swaying between strategic cooperation and 
deterrence, and instability rises in the Asia-Pacific region.
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